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In December 1991, the U.S. Congress passed the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA),
which emphasized the importance of capital ratios in
addressing the problems that led to the large number of
bank and thrift failures in the 1980s. In addressing these
issues, FDICIA contained two key provisions designed to
reduce the cost and frequency of failed banks. First, FDICIA
contained a provision for early closure of institutions that
allowed bank regulators to close failing institutions at a
positive level of capital. Such an early closure policy had
been advocated as a solution to excessive losses to the
deposit insurance fund, as discussed by Kane (1983). The
second key provision of FDICIA, prompt corrective action
(PCA), involved early intervention in problem banks by
bank regulators. While PCA was intended to supplement the
existing supervisory authority of bank regulators, FDICIA
legislated mandatory intervention, rather than regulatory
discretion, in undercapitalized institutions in an effort to
save banks from becoming insolvent.
To date, the PCA provisions of FDICIA appear to
have been a major success in improving the safety and
soundness of the U.S. banking system. Failures declined
precipitously in the years following the passage of FDICIA,
while a casual observation of bank capital ratios and levels
suggests that PCA has been successful in getting banks to
increase capital. From year-end 1991 through year-end
1993, equity capital held by U.S. commercial banks in
the aggregate increased by over $65 billion, an increase
of 28.0 percent, while the ratio of equity capital to assets
increased from 6.75 percent to 8.01 percent.
While the adoption and implementation of PCA
has focused attention on bank capital ratios, two issues
merit further attention. First, did PCA cause banks to
increase their capital ratios, or is the increase attributable
to some other factor such as bank income levels in the
early 1990s? Second, a number of theoretical and empirical
studies suggest that increasingly stringent regulatory
capital standards in general, and PCA in particular, may
have the unintended effect of causing banks to increase
their level of portfolio risk.
This paper examines the impact that the PCA
standards had on bank portfolios following the passage of
FDICIA in 1991. To do this, the simultaneous equations
model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), and later
modified by Jacques and Nigro (1997) to study the impact
of risk-based capital, is used to examine how PCA simulta-
neously influenced bank capital ratios and portfolio risk
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levels. Unlike prior studies on this topic, by using a simul-
taneous equations model, the endogeneity of both capital
and portfolio risk is explicitly recognized, and as such, the
impact of possible changes in bank capital ratios on risk in
a bank’s portfolio can be examined.
THE PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION STANDARDS
In December 1991, the U.S. Congress passed FDICIA,
with the PCA provisions becoming effective in December
1992. Specifically, Section 131 of FDICIA, defined for
banks five capital thresholds used to determine what super-
visory actions would be taken by bank regulators, with
increasingly severe restrictions being applied to banks as
their capital ratios declined. As shown in Table 1, banks are
classified into one of five capital categories depending on
how well they meet capital thresholds based on their total
risk-based capital ratio, Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, and
Tier 1 leverage ratio.1 For example, in order to be classified as
well capitalized, a bank must have a total risk-based capital
ratio greater than or equal to 10 percent, a Tier 1 risk-based
capital ratio greater than or equal to 6 percent, and a Tier 1
leverage ratio greater than 5 percent, while adequately capi-
talized institutions have minimum thresholds of 8 percent,
4 percent, and 4 percent, respectively. If a bank falls into
one of the three undercapitalized categories, mandatory
restrictions are placed on its activities that become increas-
ingly severe as the bank’s capital ratios deteriorate. For
example, undercapitalized banks are subject to restrictions
that include the need to submit and implement a capital
restoration plan, limits on asset growth, and restrictions on
new lines of business, while significantly undercapitalized
banks face all of the restrictions imposed on undercapital-
ized banks, as well as restrictions on interest rates paid on
deposits, limits on transactions with affiliates and affiliated
banks, and others. Finally, once a bank’s tangible equity
ratio falls to 2 percent or less, the bank is considered to
be critically undercapitalized and faces not only more
stringent restrictions on activities, but also the appointment
of a conservator (receiver) within ninety days of becom-
ing critically undercapitalized.2
Table 1 also shows the breakdown of insured com-
mercial banks by PCA zone over the period 1991-93. For
example, at year-end 1991, the time when FDICIA was
passed, 10,725 banks, accounting for only 43.3 percent of
the total assets in the U.S. banking system, were classified
as well capitalized. In contrast, 221, 71, and 96 banks were
classified as either undercapitalized, significantly under-
capitalized, and critically undercapitalized, respectively. In
total, 388 banks with 10.88 percent of all bank assets were
undercapitalized to some degree at the end of 1991 and
therefore faced at least some degree of regulatory sanction
if their capital ratios did not improve by the time PCA
went into effect.
By year-end 1992, the period after PCA provisions
were announced but before they went into effect, the
results in Table 1 show that well-capitalized banks num-
bered 10,989, accounting for over 87 percent of all bank
assets, while all types of undercapitalized banks fell to only
142, thus accounting for less than 1 percent of total bank
assets. A similar but less dramatic shift is seen in 1993, the
first year the PCA regulations were in effect. By year-end
1993, 96.24 percent of banking assets were in banks classi-
fied as well capitalized, while only forty-eight banks were
classified in the three undercapitalized zones, and those
banks accounted for less than 0.25 percent of all banking
Table 1









Well capitalized ³10% ³6% ³5%
Adequately capitalized ³8% ³4% ³4%
Undercapitalized <8% <4% <4%
Significantly undercapitalized <6% <3% <3%
Critically undercapitalized Tangible equity £ 2%
NUMBER OF BANKS AND PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL BANK ASSETS BY PCA ZONE
PCA Zone 1991 1992 1993
Well capitalized 10,725 10,989  10,752
43.30 87.51 96.24
Adequately capitalized 807 335 171
45.82 11.72 3.51
Undercapitalized 221 67 22
10.17 0.29 0.11
Significantly undercapitalized 71 33 16
0.39 0.17 0.12
Critically undercapitalized 96 42 10
0.32 0.32 0.03
Source:  Data are from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 25
assets. These findings suggest that PCA had a significant
announcement effect on bank capital ratios during 1992, as
well as a significant implementation effect on capital ratios
once the standards were implemented.
While PCA appears to have been effective in get-
ting banks to increase their capital ratios, it has not been
without its critics.3 One criticism that has been levied
against regulatory capital standards in general is that they
may lead to increasing levels of bank portfolio risk.
Research by Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980),
and Kim and Santomero (1988) has shown, using the
mean-variance framework, that regulatory capital standards
cause leverage and risk to become substitutes and that as
regulators require banks to meet more stringent capital
standards, banks respond by choosing assets with greater
risk.4 Thus, increases in minimum capital standards by
bank regulators cause banks to increase not only their capital
ratios, but also have the unintended effect of causing them
to increase their level of risk.
While one of the primary purposes of early closure
is to prevent banks from taking increasing levels of risk as
they approach insolvency, recent research by Levonian
(1991) and Davies and McManus (1991) demonstrates that
early closure may fail to protect the deposit insurance fund
from losses because it creates incentives for banks to
increase portfolio risk by increasing their holdings of high-
risk assets. As such, the design of the PCA standards has
important implications not only for capital levels, but also
for the level of risk, and ultimately, the safety and sound-
ness of the banking system.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
To examine the possible impact of the PCA standards on
bank capital ratios and portfolio risk levels, the simulta-
neous equation model developed by Shrieves and Dahl
(1992) is modified to incorporate the PCA zones. In their
model, observed changes in bank capital ratios and portfo-
lio risk levels are decomposed into two components, a dis-
cretionary adjustment and a change caused by an
exogenously determined random shock such that:
(1) DCAP j t , D
d
CAPj t , Ej t , + =
(2) ,
where   and   are the observed changes in
capital ratios and risk levels for bank j in period t,
 and   represent the discretionary
adjustments in capital ratios and risk levels, and   and
 are exogenous shocks. Recognizing that banks may
not be able to adjust to their desired capital ratios and risk
levels instantaneously, the discretionary changes in capital
and risk are modeled using the partial adjustment frame-
work. As a result:
(3)         ;
(4)         .
Thus, the observed changes in bank capital ratios
and portfolio risk levels in period t are a function of the tar-
get capital ratio   and target risk level  ,
the lagged capital ratio   and risk levels  ,
and any random shocks. The target capital ratio and risk
level are not observable, but are assumed to depend upon
some set of observable variables including the size of the
bank (SIZE), multibank holding company status (BHC), a
bank’s income (INC), changes in portfolio risk
, and capital ratios  , while the
exogenous shock that could affect bank capital ratios or
risk levels is the regulatory pressure brought about by
PCA.
Specifically,  SIZE is measured as the natural log of
total assets and BHC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
bank is affiliated with a multibank holding company. As
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) note, size may have an impact on
a bank’s capital ratios and level of portfolio risk because
larger banks have greater access to capital markets. For
banks belonging to multibank holding companies, both
capital and portfolio risk may be managed at the holding
company level, thus resulting in these banks having lower
target capital ratios and higher target portfolio risk levels
than independent banks. Following Jacques and Nigro
(1997), the ratio of net income to total assets, INC, is
included to recognize the ability of profitable banks to
increase their capital ratios by using retained earnings. In
addition, as noted by the use of the partial adjustment
DRISKj t , D
dRISKj t , Uj t , + =
DCAPjt , DRISKjt ,
D
d




DCAPj t , a CAP*
j t , CAP j t 1 – , – () Ejt , + =
DRISKj t , b RISK*
j t , RISKj t 1 – , – () Uj t , + =
CAP*
jt , D RISK*
j t ,
CAPt 1 – RISKt 1 –
DRISKjt , () DCAPjt , ()
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model, lagged capital ratios and risk levels are included to
measure the fact that banks adjust their capital ratios and
risk levels to their target levels over time.
To recognize the possible simultaneous relation-
ship between capital and risk,   and   are
included in the risk and capital equations, respectively.
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) note that a positive relationship
between changes in capital and risk may signify, among
other possibilities, the unintended impact of minimum
regulatory capital requirements, while Jacques and Nigro
(1997) note that a negative relationship may result because
of methodological flaws in the capital standards underlying
PCA.5 Empirical estimation of the simultaneous equations
model requires measures of both bank capital ratios and
portfolio risk. Following previous research, portfolio risk
was measured in two ways, using both the total risk-
weighted assets as a percentage of total assets (RWARAT)
and nonperforming loans as a percentage of total assets
(NONP).6 Avery and Berger (1991) have shown that
RWARAT correlates with risky behavior, while other stud-
ies, such as those by Berger (1995) and Shrieves and Dahl
(1992), use nonperforming loans. With respect to capital,
the leverage ratio is used because Baer and McElravey
(1992) find it was more binding than the risk-based capital
standards during the period under study.
Of particular interest in this study is the regula-
tory pressure variables. Consistent with Shrieves and Dahl
(1992), this study uses dummy variables to signify the
degree of regulatory pressure that a bank is under. Specifi-
cally, the PCA dummies are:
PCAA = 1 if the bank is adequately capitalized; else = 0.
PCAU = 1 if the bank is undercapitalized, substantially
undercapitalized, or critically undercapitalized (here-
after referred to as undercapitalized); else = 0.
These variables allow banks across different PCA zones to
respond differently, both in capital ratios and in portfolio
risk. A priori, banks in the undercapitalized group, PCAU,
would be expected to have the strongest response because
PCA imposes penalties on their activities. Furthermore,
adequately capitalized banks, PCAA, may increase their
capital ratios or reduce their portfolio risk if they perceive a
DCAPjt , DRISKjt ,
significant penalty for not being considered well capital-
ized, or if they desire to hold a buffer stock of capital as a
cushion against shocks to equity as argued by Wall and
Peterson (1987, 1995) and Furlong (1992). Besides being
included as a separate variable, PCA is included in an
interaction term with the lagged capital ratios. The use of
this term allows banks in different PCA zones to have dif-
ferent speeds of adjustment to their target capital ratios. As
such, banks in the undercapitalized PCA zones would be
expected to adjust their capital ratios at faster rates than
better capitalized banks.




where   and   are error terms, and
 and   are interac-
tion terms, which allow a bank’s speed of adjustment to
be influenced by the PCA zone the bank is in.
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
As noted earlier, the FDICIA was passed in December
1991, with the PCA thresholds becoming effective in
December 1992. This study covers the period after passage
but before implementation (1992), and the first year the
PCA standards were in effect (1993). In addition, because
all of the capital ratios used in PCA are available beginning
at the end of 1990, 1991 is used as a control period. As
noted earlier, a significant decline in the number of all
types of undercapitalized institutions occurred during the
year after FDICIA was passed. This result is not surprising
because restrictions would be placed on the activities of
these banks beginning in December 1992. Alternatively, in
studying the impact of the risk-based capital standards,
Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) note that because the com-
position of bank portfolios can be changed quickly, and
DCAPjt , d0 d1SIZEjt , d2BHCjt , d3INCjt ,
d4DRISKjt , d5PCAA d6PCAU
d7CAPjt 1 – , d8PCAA CAPjt 1 – , ´






DRISKjt , l0 l1SIZEjt , l2BHCjt ,
l3DCAPjt , l4RISKjt1 – ,




mjt , wjt ,
PCAA CA ´ Pjt 1 – , PCAU CA ´ Pjt 1 – ,FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 27
because banks appear to have experienced a period of learn-
ing, the impact appears more clearly after the implementation
date. The same argument may be true for PCA, although
learning by banks may be less significant with regard to PCA
because all of the capital ratios defined in the PCA standards
had been in effect since at least December 1990.7
RESULTS
This study examines 2,552 FDIC-insured commercial
banks with assets of $100 million or more using year-end
call report data from 1990 through 1993.8 The model is
estimated using the two-stage least squares procedure,
which recognizes the endogeneity of both bank capital
ratios and risk levels in a simultaneous equation frame-
work, and unlike ordinary least squares, provides consis-
tent parameter estimates.
The results of estimating the simultaneous system of
equations 5 and 6 are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 uses
the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWARAT)
to measure portfolio risk, while Table 3 measures risk
using nonperforming loans as a percentage of total assets
(NONP). All of the variables included to explain variations
in capital ratios and risk levels are statistically significant
in at least some of the equations. Bank size (SIZE) had a
negative and significant impact on capital ratios in two
equations, while multibank holding company status (BHC)
was consistently negative and significant in the capital
equations. Income (INC) had a positive and significant
impact on capital ratios in all equations, suggesting that
one reason for increasing capital ratios by banks over the
period studied was the increase in their income levels. The
parameter estimates on lagged risk   in the
risk equations range from 5.3 percent to 24.7 percent,
while the parameter estimates on lagged capital
 in the capital equations range from 6.2 per-
cent to 8.9 percent. These results imply that banks
RISKjt ,1 – ()
CAPjt ,1 – ()
Table 2
TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION ON RISK (RWARAT) AND CAPITAL
1991 1992 1993
Variable DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK
INTERCEPT 0.005* 0.021* 0.005* 0.029* 0.007* 0.032*
(7.57) (2.89) (6.77) (6.33) (8.46) (7.62)
SIZE -0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000*
(-1.27) (1.71) (0.66) (-0.92) (1.09) (-1.97)
BHC -0.001* 0.015* -0.002* 0.004* -0.003* 0.008*
(-3.83) (5.33) (-5.64) (2.48) (-7.51) (4.64)
INC 0.387* — 0.551* — 0.409* —
(20.32) (26.47) (14.71)
CAPt-1 -0.070* — -0.089* — -0.062* —
(-9.47) (-11.39) (-7.31)
RISKt-1 — -0.144* — -0.069* — -0.053*
(-13.11) (-8.99) (-7.74)
DCAP — 1.351* — 0.284* — 0.552*
(8.14) (2.74) (3.20)
DRISK 0.017* — 0.014* — 0.042* —
(5.47) (4.24) (2.61)
PCAA 0.009* 0.037* 0.022* -0.015* 0.027* -0.024*
(2.98) (9.25) (6.10) (-4.32) (3.72) (-4.78)
PCAU 0.023* 0.037* 0.039* -0.016* 0.024* -0.037*
(8.05) (5.01) (9.70) (-2.40) (3.17) (-3.97)
PCAA ´ CAPt-1 -0.135* — -0.301* — -0.389* —
(-2.92) (-4.91) (-3.19)
PCAU ´ CAPt-1 -0.319* — -0.627* — -0.129 —
(-5.17) (-6.75) (-0.68)
R2 .218 .123 .271 .063 .146 .060
Note: t-statistics appear in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
**  Significant at the 10 percent level.28 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
adjusted their capital ratios and risk positions very slowly
over this period to their target levels. Finally, Tables 2 and
3 show mixed results in assessing the relationship between
changes in capital ratios and changes in risk. When portfo-
lio risk was measured using NONP, the changes in capital
ratios and risk were negatively correlated, but when portfo-
lio risk was measured using RWARAT, the parameter
estimates were positive. Thus, the relationship between
changes in capital ratios and changes in risk during this
period is not unambiguous. The goal of this study is to
clarify this relationship by examining the possible simulta-
neous impact of the PCA standards on both bank capital
ratios and risk levels.
IMPACT OF PCA ON CAPITAL
In examining the impact of PCA, the results in Tables 2
and 3 provide some rather interesting insights. In the capi-
tal equations of each table, the impact of the regulatory
pressure variables are captured both by an intercept term
(PCAA or PCAU) and a speed of adjustment term
(  or  ). For adequately
capitalized banks (PCAA), regulatory pressure had a positive
impact on capital ratios in both 1992 and 1993, with the
parameter estimate in most cases being at least 100 percent
larger in 1992 and 1993 than in 1991. Furthermore, the
speed of adjustment terms for adequately capitalized banks
are statistically significant, being in most cases two to four
times greater in 1992 and 1993 than in 1991. Taken
together, these results suggest that in both 1992 and 1993,
banks classified as being adequately capitalized increased
their capital ratios and the speed with which they adjusted
their capital ratios in response to PCA. Furthermore, this
result is consistent with the hypothesis that banks held
capital above the regulatory minimum as a buffer against
shocks that could cause their capital ratios to fall below the
adequately capitalized thresholds.
PCAA C ´ APt 1 – PCAU C ´ APt 1 –
Table 3
TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION ON RISK (NONP) AND CAPITAL
1991 1992 1993
Variable DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK
INTERCEPT 0.004* 0.001* 0.004* 0.001* 0.004* 0.000**
(5.42) (5.71) (5.38) (4.43) (3.90) (1.71)
SIZE -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(-1.67) (0.38) (-1.71) (-4.07) (-1.07) (-0.23)
BHC -0.001* -0.001* -0.002* -0.001* -0.003* -0.000
(-4.03) (-2.55) (-6.35) (-3.11) (-6.56) (-1.07)
INC 0.436* — 0.578* — 0.594* —
(20.14) (25.70) (14.98)
CAPt-1 -0.078* — -0.089* — -0.086* —
(-10.14) (-10.66) (-8.62)
RISKt-1 — -0.247* — -0.171* — -0.228*
(-18.31) (-11.78) (-17.62)
DCAP — -0.011 — -0.058* — 0.076*
(-0.61) (-3.52) (3.00)
DRISK -0.295* — -0.476* — -0.957* —
(-5.43) (-9.43) (-6.43)
PCAA 0.011* 0.000 0.015* 0.003* 0.036* -0.000
(3.55) (1.11) (3.67) (4.84) (4.14) (-0.20)
PCAU 0.021* -0.000 0.028* 0.000 0.034* -0.006*
(7.19) (-0.37) (6.35) (0.35) (3.67) (-4.57)
PCAA ´ CAPt-1 -0.165* — -0.166* — -0.599* —
(-3.42) (-2.47) (-4.05)
PCAU ´ CAPt-1 -0.302* — -0.414* — -0.601* —
(-4.66) (-4.06) (-2.52)
R2 .194 .134 .261 .078 .119 .144
Note: t-statistics appear in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
**  Significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 29
The same results appear to hold true for undercap-
italized banks (PCAU), although the timing and magni-
tude of the changes appear somewhat different. The
parameter estimates on PCAU are significantly different
from zero in both 1992 and 1993, and in all cases, they are
larger than during the control period. In addition, the
speed of adjustment estimates are generally significant and of
greater magnitude than during the control period, thereby
suggesting that undercapitalized banks adjusted their capital
ratios at much faster rates than their well-capitalized
counterparts. Examining the results in Table 2, the
parameter estimates on PCAU and   for
1992 are almost twice as large as the estimates for the
control period, while the 1993 estimates are similar in
magnitude or not significant. These results are not surpris-
ing because banks that were classified in one of the three
undercapitalized zones at the end of 1991 faced regulatory
sanctions if they did not significantly increase their capital
ratios by the time the PCA standards went into effect in
December 1992.
It is also interesting to compare the parameter
estimates on PCAU and PCAA in the capital equations. In
general, the estimates on PCAU and 
are larger than similar estimates for adequately capitalized
banks in 1992, but not in 1993. This result is also not
surprising because undercapitalized banks faced severe
restrictions on their activities once PCA went into effect,
while adequately capitalized banks did not.
IMPACT OF PCA ON RISK
With respect to portfolio risk, the results in Tables 2 and 3
provide some evidence that the regulatory pressure
brought about by PCA led both adequately capitalized and
undercapitalized banks to decrease their level of portfolio
risk. While the results with respect to risk in Table 3 are
generally insignificant, when portfolio risk is measured
using RWARAT (Table 2), the results suggest that ade-
quately capitalized banks (PCAA) significantly decreased
their portfolio risk in both 1992 and 1993, with the
parameter estimate for 1993 being 60 percent larger than
the estimate for 1992. In a similar manner, the parameter
estimates for undercapitalized banks (PCAU) in Table 2 are
PCAU C ´ APt 1 –
PCAU C ´ APt 1 –
negative and significant in both 1992 and 1993, with the
parameter estimate for 1993 being more than twice as
large as the 1992 estimate. This is in sharp contrast to the
results for 1991, where the parameter estimates for both
adequately capitalized and undercapitalized banks are posi-
tive and significant, thus suggesting that these banks were
increasing portfolio risk in the period before FDICIA was
passed. For 1992 and 1993, the reduction in risk is not
surprising because while PCA was announced in December
1991, sanctions and restrictions on banks became effective
at the end of 1992. Therefore, if banks viewed the sanc-
tions associated with PCA as being costly, they had a
greater incentive once PCA became effective to reduce their
portfolio risk level, and thereby reduce the probability of
falling below the capital thresholds due to shocks to equity
or income.
Finally, the 1992 parameter estimate on PCAU in
Table 2 is almost identical to that on PCAA, a result that
suggests that while both types of banks responded to the
announcement of PCA by reducing risk, the reduction in
risk by undercapitalized banks was not significantly differ-
ent from that of adequately capitalized institutions. Given
the results of the capital equations in Table 2 that under-
capitalized banks had larger adjustments to their capital
ratios in 1992 than in 1993, and recognizing that under-
capitalized banks may be able to adjust their risk levels
faster than they can adjust their capital ratios, it is possible
that undercapitalized banks emphasized increasing capital
rather than reducing risk in 1992. However, in 1993, the
parameter estimate on PCAU in the risk equation of Table 2
is over 50 percent greater than the parameter estimate on
PCAA. This provides some evidence that undercapitalized
banks may have felt even greater pressure than adequately
capitalized banks to reduce their level of portfolio risk once
the PCA standards became effective.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the
impact of the PCA standards on bank capital ratios and
portfolio risk levels. The results suggest that during both
1992 and 1993, adequately capitalized and undercapital-
ized banks increased their capital ratios and the rate at30 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
which they adjusted their capital ratios in response to the
PCA standards. In addition, this study finds some evidence
that the PCA standards led to significant reductions in
portfolio risk, particularly in 1993, the year after PCA
took effect. While these results do not guarantee that
bank capital levels are adequate relative to the risk in
bank portfolios, they do suggest that PCA has been effec-
tive in getting banks to simultaneously increase their
capital ratios and reduce their level of portfolio risk.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or
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1. In addition, FDICIA authorizes bank regulators to reclassify a bank
at a lower capital category if, in the opinion of the bank regulators, the
bank is operating in an unsafe or unsound manner.
2. The tangible equity ratio equals the total of Tier 1 capital plus
cumulative preferred stock and related surplus less intangibles except
qualifying purchased-mortgage-servicing rights divided by the total of
bank assets less intangible assets except qualifying purchased-mortgage-
servicing rights.
3. For example, see Peek and Rosengren (1996, 1997).
4. The mean-variance framework has been criticized by some because it
fails to incorporate the effects of deposit insurance. See Furlong and
Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990).
5. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) note that a positive relationship between
changes in capital ratios and portfolio risk may also occur because of
regulatory costs, bankruptcy cost avoidance, and managerial risk
aversion. 
6. Because loans made in a given year will not be recognized as
nonperforming until a future period, we follow Shrieves and Dahl (1992)
and use nonperforming loans in the following year. Thus, the NONP
variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets from year-end
1992 through 1994. 
7. Finally, a word of caution is necessary because this analysis may be
complicated by other factors present during this time period, such as the
end of the interim period for implementation of the risk-based capital
standards and other provisions of FDICIA, all of which make it difficult
to isolate and definitively assess the impact of the PCA provisions.
Nevertheless, with the simultaneous assessment of changes in bank
capital, portfolio risk, and the regulatory environment, this study is a
significant improvement over our prior understanding of the impact of
FDICIA, in general, and PCA, in particular. 
8. As noted in endnote 6, because of the nature of nonperforming loans,
NONP was calculated using year-end data from 1992 through 1994.32 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 NOTES
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